Message of the Chairman _
For the seventh time since its creation, our Institute takes a formal position on a significant governance topic. This time, we are making a series of recommendations about the role of proxy advisors and their influence on the governance of public corporations.
These advisers play a significant role by making recommendations to institutional investors on how to vote on various issues submitted to a shareholder vote at the annual meeting of shareholders. The criticisms levied at these advisors by corporate officers and board members have been numerous and scathing. This policy paper examines the situation and makes a number of pertinent recommendations.
I am grateful for the precious contribution of our board members to the contents of this policy position.
The board approved this position in January 2013
We hope that our analysis and recommendations will prove a valuable contribution to the discussion and resolution of a very salient corporate governance issue.
YVAN ALLAIRE, PH.D. (MIT), FRSC Executive Chair
The changing times created a business opportunity. As institutional investors and fund managers came to collectively own a large majority of all shares in circulation, their fiduciary obligation, or duty to vote their proxies created a logistical problem.
Proxy advisors, firms specializing in analyzing the information and issuing voting recommendations to their clients, institutional investors and fund managers of all stripes, came about to tap into this market niche.
The outcome was somewhat unexpected. Proxy advisors now stand in a bully pulpit from which to harangue corporate management and boards of directors on all matters of governance and compensation; neither investors, nor investment advisers, they enjoy a franchise to "make recommendations" to investors on how to discharge their fiduciary responsibility as shareholders.
Their influence has grown in spite of repeated criticism of their performance, because investors seemed to find these "advisors" useful in discharging what could be an onerous responsibility. Neither regulated, nor supervised, proxy advisers rely on a business model that makes it virtually impossible for them to handle with care and responsiveness the sheer volume of reports they have to produce in a very short period of time. In the case of ISS, the firm is also vulnerable to conflicts of interests.
Their role in defining what is proper governance, what is an effective board and how should executives be compensated gives them an undue, unhealthy influence on the functioning of private corporations.
Eventually, the chorus of critics got the attention of the securities regulators in the USA, in Canada, in France, which set up consultation processes to determine what, if anything should be done.
The litany of issues raised about proxy advisors is troublesome:
•
Lack of transparency as to the process by which they arrive at formulating their recommendations;
• Inaccuracies in their analysis and unresponsiveness to corporate demands for corrections;
• Conflicts of interest, in particular for ISS, by their offering of several services to the same corporations which are the subject of their proxy recommendations;
• More subtle criticisms focus on their definition of «good» governance and the lack of (or very weak) empirical evidence that their kind of governance has any influence on the performance of companies;
• Proxy advisors have a vested interest in raising the bar of «good» governance from year to year to justify their continued employment;
Executive Summary _
The influence of proxy advisers on corporate governance makes some, many, boards of directors overly preoccupied with ensuring favorable recommendations from proxy advisers, by taking pre-emptive steps to ensure that their policies on governance and executive pay will not trigger a negative score when fed into the proxy advisers' standardized algorithm;
• Their business model is problematic. Because their clients, institutional investors, collectively own shares in all publicly listed companies, they have to provide «advice» for all these corporations. In Canada, some 1570 companies are listed on the TSX and another 2,200 are listed on the TSX Venture. The financial year of roughly 84% of companies listed on the TSX ends on December 31st. For some 80% of TSX listed companies, there were less than 50 days between the date the Management Information Circular is received by shareholders and the ultimate date for proxy voting. (IGOPP research, 2012) . These statistics create a fundamental issue for these service providers and raise basic questions about their business model. How can they cope with this mass of data and come up with fair and thoughtful recommendations for thousands of corporations in a matter of a few weeks in the spring of each year;
• Surprising and puzzling is the role these proxy advisors are now playing in all cases of mergers, acquisitions, proxy contests and all other litigious matters. Proxy advisers offer their opinion on almost all litigious, contentious issues. As these issues often come about as a result of the actions of some activist hedge funds, a proxy advisor's favourable opinion, from ISS particularly, is a highly prized input to the argumentation of activist funds. The potential for conflicts of interest is decupled in these highly charged confrontations with huge sums of money at stakes.
This policy paper makes recommendations to institutional investors as the prime clients of proxy advisors and to securities commissions as the protectors of the integrity of financial markets.
RESPONSIBILITY OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
Large institutional investors bear a singular responsibility for this state of affairs. They carry the fiduciary responsibility to vote proxies in the interest of their stakeholders, a responsibility they cannot farm out to proxy advisors. Most large institutional investors maintain adamantly that they do not sub-contract this responsibility but merely use proxy advisors as information gatherers and providers of opinions.
Even for that limited role, large institutional investors, as clients of proxy advisory services, should demand that they be given full information on their business model: part-time vs. full-time employees, location of employees, extent of work performed in foreign countries, training of employees, proficiency of the staff, the ways the advisory service copes with the logistics of having to formulate opinions/ recommendations on thousands of proposals within a very short time period.
As clients of these advisors, they should demand explicit statements of conflicts of interest whenever these advisors are involved in M&A transactions, proxy contests or other litigious matters. Canadian institutional investors should object vigorously to ISS basing some of its «guidelines» on poorly designed studies carried out in the American context.
CANADIAN REGULATORS
The consultation document produced by the Canadian Securities Administrators has provided an excellent summary of the issues as well as some potential remedies. We urge the Canadian regulators to examine the recommendations made in this policy paper as they proceed to set a course forward concerning the proper supervision of proxy advisors.
Indeed, it is a recipe for troubles to co-locate two businesses within the same corporation, one advising institutional investors on how to vote on issues of momentous significance to corporations, the other one advising corporations on how to meet the standards of "good" governance set by proxy advisors.
Canadian regulators should certainly prohibit ISS from offering its corporate services to corporations about which ISS issues proxy voting recommendations to its institutional clients.
At a minimum, Canadian regulators should demand that ISS provide to its institutional clientele the list of clients of ISS Corporate Services, Inc. for which proxy voting advice is put forth by ISS.
Furthermore, whenever proxy advisors get involved in takeover situations when they are actually advising their clients and the shareholders at large as to the adequacy of the bidder's price for a transaction, regulators should subject them to the regulatory framework applicable to financial advisers and investment bankers offering an "opinion" on the advisability of a transaction.
Finally, Canadian regulators should demand that proxy advisors set standards for the training, expertise and experience of analysts preparing proxy advisors' reports. All in all, the business of proxy advisors, though seemingly filling a need, brings forth a host of issues, which, if they are not dealt with vigorously and effectively, may well result in a warped system of governance and a serious failure of accountability.
Executive Summary _ Once upon a time, individual investors held the majority of shares in publicly listed corporations. Some of them would attend the annual meeting of shareholders; others would appoint management as their proxy to vote their shares; most would not bother to do either. Then, sometime during the 1990s, investment funds and funds of all stripes and colors became collectively the majority shareholders of corporations.
The managers of these funds have a fiduciary responsibility to protect the interest of their clients. In the USA, investment advisors subject to ERISA and/or to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 have an affirmative fiduciary duty to vote all portfolio shares on all matters
Yet, corporate governance has become a growth industry with ever increasing requirements to meet the standards of "good" governance and, thus, many more opportunities for corporations to fail to meet one or the other of the evolving governance norms and guidelines.
As institutional investors and fund managers came to collectively own a large majority of all shares in circulation, the fiduciary obligation, or duty, for fund managers to vote their proxies created a logistical problem.
They had to assess the compliance of large number of corporations with an ever increasing list of principles, rules and canons of good governance in order to cast an informed vote for board members up for election; as well they had to decide how to vote on the mushrooming number of shareholder proposals put forth for the annual meeting of shareholders.
Proxy advisors seemed to offer a partial way out of this quandary.
Smaller investment funds, it is claimed, do not have the means and the resources to carry out their fiduciary duty to vote their proxies. At first blush, this claim is somewhat surprising. These smaller funds hold shares in a very small fraction of the universe of listed corporations. These investment funds have, or claim to have, the resources to carry out the sort of analysis required to back up their decision to invest in a given company, to monitor the performance of that company, and to decide to remain invested or to pull out of the stock! Yet, it is claimed, they do not have the resources to make their own decision on governance matters for these same companies.
In fact, many small investment firms do carry out their own analysis and make their own mind on how to vote on specific shareholder issues. There is a mildly interesting debate as to the extent of their real influence on voting. It is somewhat amusing to watch proxy advisers trying to marshal all evidence «proving» that they are less influential than it appears. Academics are lined up on both sides of the issue of whether proxy advisers influence 20%-30% of the votes (Brossy, 2012; Cai, Garner and Walking, 2009, inter alia) or 6%-10% (Choi, Fisch, Kahan, 2010) .
Introduction
However, corporate observers with actual experience of the process note with some dismay the number of proxy votes coming in immediately after the proxy advisers have issued their recommendations.
(See, inter alia, the submission of IBM to the SEC concept release on the U.S. proxy system, October 15, 2010). The SEC was deluged with informed comments, telling examples and drastic recommendations for action but, overwhelmed by the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, has not taken any action yet. The litany of issues raised about proxy advisors is fairly invariable:
In a 2010 survey by Towers
• Lack of transparency as to the process by which they arrive at formulating their recommendations;
• Conflicts of interest, in particular for ISS, by their offering of several services to the same corporations which are the subject of their proxy recommendations; • Then, these proxy consultants have a vested interest in raising the bar of «good» governance from year to year to justify their continued employment. They thus become de facto generators of new governance rules and the arbiters of compliance to their rules. Yet, these new "rules" are not vetted nor subjected to the review process mandatory for any new rule proposed by the regulators.
• The influence of proxy advisers on corporate governance makes some, many, boards of directors overly preoccupied with ensuring favorable recommendations from proxy advisers, taking preemptive steps to ensure that their policies on governance and executive pay will not trigger a negative score when fed into the proxy advisers' standardized algorithm. Proxy advisors have now been granted additional leverage by the "say-on-pay" initiative whereby shareholders get to cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation. The practice has now become mandatory in the USA and is spreading fast all over the developed economies. Having to pass judgment on the appropriateness of executive compensation, a challenging, very complex task, many institutional investors have come to rely on proxy advisors for "guidance". A more useful and pertinent approach would be for proxy advisors to provide information and various metrics on executive pay without formulating a voting recommendation but letting their clients judge the relevance of this information for their own decision-making.
RECOMMENDATION I
Large institutional investors, to the extent that they share the views on compensation defended by IGOPP and others, should make it clear to corporations and to proxy advisors that they do not consider their guidelines on executive compensation appropriate or useful and that they will not give any weight to voting recommendations based on these metrics. The consultation processes of the SEC and the CSA have produced an abundance of comments and suggestions on how to deal with these issues. Several make good sense and would indeed improve matters measurably. Many suggestions are aimed at improving the time frame for corporate issuers to correct errors or misstatements of information as well as responsiveness to counter-argument about the recommendations formulated by proxy advisors. These suggestions, though sensible, do not take into account the business model of these proxy advisors. Indeed, it seems to us that there are three fundamental issues with the proxy adviser system which must be addressed urgently: Proxy advisory firms use these statistics to justify their usefulness and promote their services. But these very statistics create a fundamental issue for these service providers and raise basic questions about their business model. How can they cope with this mass of data and come up with fair and thoughtful recommendations for thousands of corporations in a matter of a few weeks in the spring of each year.
Only by one of two measures, or a combination of the two, can they accomplish this feat and these will not produce thoughtful and calibrated recommendations:
1.
A standardized grid, a sort of simplified algorithm (often termed a «cookie-cutter» or a «one-size-fits-all» approach), with which corporations are scored for their governance, boards are assessed, compensation is appraised, and shareholder proposals are vetted. Certainly the guidelines of ISS for their assessment of executive compensation described earlier provide a striking example of that process.
2.
The hiring of temporary staff, as well as farming out of the analytical part of the process to lowcost countries, to cope with the avalanche of data in the spring; that coping mechanism raises the issues of competence and training of these part-time employees. 
Their business model _

RECOMMENDATION II
Clients of proxy advisors should insist on divulgation of all pertinent details of the business models used by proxy advisors: part-time vs. full-time employees, location of employees, extent of work performed in foreign countries, training of employees.
RECOMMENDATION III
Regulators should require that proxy advisors report on their standards of training and experience for their analysts, somewhat akin to what is required of rating agencies at this time: The SEC has proposed and adopted the following standards and rules for rating agencies (formally known as Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations or NRSROs): "Consistent with Section 936 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the proposed rule would require NRSROs to establish standards of training, experience and competence for credit analysts and to:
Consider certain factors when establishing the standards, for example the complexity of the securities that will be rated by the analyst.
Periodically test its credit analysts on the credit rating procedures and methodologies it uses.
Require that at least one individual with three or more years of experience in performing credit analysis participates in determining a credit rating." (Emphasis added)"
Their business model _ One might have reasonably expected that these advisory firms would have remained private, professional organizations, owned by partners fully accountable for the quality of services offered and very vigilant about potential conflicts of interest, somewhat akin to firms of auditors, post Anderson debacle and the Enron fiasco.
It is useful to be reminded how these accounting firms swore at the time that their consulting services to the same firms they were auditing were in no way a source of conflict of interest, that impenetrable "Chinese walls" separated consulting services from auditing services! Such statements failed to persuade regulators. Auditing firms had to stop offering management consulting services to the same firms they were auditing.
But it is not so, certainly for ISS. The firm was bought in 2006 by Risk Metrics, a corporation offering all kinds of consulting services to the same companies about which ISS gets to give advice to institutional investors. Then, in 2008, Risk Metrics became a publicly listed company. In 2010 Risk Metrics itself was bought by stock-market listed MSCI, a firm offering multiple services to institutional investors.
The well documented pressures of financial markets to deliver ever growing earnings per share (EPS) translate into internal pressures on management to meet financial market expectations. It is one of the crucial mistakes of our financial age to allow market sentinels become themselves publicly listed. It has happened with stock exchanges worldwide; it happened with rating agency Moody's. But here's how Eric Kolchinsky, manager in charge of CDO ratings at Moody's, describes for the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission the change in culture and values at Moody's after it became a publicly listed corporation: Of course ISS claims that all steps and measures are taken to protect their organization against conflicts of interest, or more accurately, from the temptation to use the leverage of their proxy advisory role to enhance their consulting revenues. Their web site refers visitors to a letter written by the well-known law firm Sullivan & Cromwell which was mandated to review the measures taken "to mitigate the potential for
conflicts of interest that may arise when ISS Governance Services provides a voting recommendation with respect to an issuer that is a client of ISS Corporate Services, Inc".
The law firm concludes "that current protections effectively manage the potential for conflict, and perceived conflict, between ICS and ISS". Their letter is dated November 29, 2007 when ISS/Risk
Metrics was still a private company and a much smaller one than it has become since. If Moody's culture and values were changed by becoming a publicly listed company, it behooves ISS to obtain a new comfort letter from Sullivan and Cromwell about the situation in 2012.
Whatever internal and external firewalls put in place to ensure that no communications seeps from one unit to the other, the very real and painful experience in other industries raises doubts about the wisdom of an organization with two units: one selling services to corporations which can be helped or hurt by the "independent advice" sold to investors by the other unit.
The movement of personnel between the two units, a normal practice in all corporations, would be an issue in this case. Yet, it appears that the head of ISS Corporate Services was, prior to this role, "a senior analyst with ISS' Proxy Advisory Service, responsible for producing analyses and vote recommendations regarding proxy contests, mergers, acquisitions, corporate restructurings, and equity plan proposals"! (ISS web site) Glass Lewis is wholly-owned by Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan. OTPP has acquired Glass Lewis from Xinhua Finance in October 2007 after Xinhua Finance had itself acquired Glass Lewis in January of that year. As a clear example that ownership matters, some senior employees of Glass Lewis left the company in May, one of them citing concerns that he was "uncomfortable with and deeply disturbed by the conduct, background, and activities of Glass Lewis's new parent, Xinhua Finance Ltd., its senior management, and its directors". (Gaffen, 2007) The Ownership Structure _ Glass Lewis is adamant however in differentiating itself from ISS. It does not offer consulting services to public corporations or directors. We are not in the business of advising public companies on their governance structures or conduct, and we refuse to use our position as trusted advisor to institutional investors to win consulting mandates with issuers (Glass Lewis web site).
While Glass Lewis asserts that it is totally independent from its owner and that the latter has no means of influencing the decisions and recommendations of Glass Lewis, it remains that this form of ownership is not optimal for a proxy advisory firm.
Ideally, proxy advisory firms should be operating with the ownership structure typical of professional organizations, similar to auditing firms for instance. As regulators have been fairly relaxed in letting most other financial market sentinels adopt the corporate form and list their shares on stock markets (viz. stock markets, rating agencies, investment bankers), it is improbable that they would insist that proxy advisors change their ownership structure.
RECOMMENDATION IV
Canadian regulators could and should prohibit ISS from offering its corporate services to corporations about which ISS issues proxy voting recommendations to its institutional clients, in the same way that auditing firms may not offer consulting services to corporations they audit.
Furthermore, a similar prohibition has been put in place for rating agencies. At a minimum, Canadian regulators (as well as ISS institutional clients) should demand that ISS provide to its institutional clientele the list of clients of ISS Corporate Services, Inc. for which proxy voting advice is put forth by ISS.
The Ownership Structure _ The role of proxy advisors in the yearly, recurring ritual of shareholders voting on various proposals is well documented and their influence ascertained in this paper and many others. The case for their usefulness, though not entirely persuasive, does receive support from institutional investors: the very large number of shareholder proposals, the complex logistics of proxy voting, arcane governance and executive compensation may justify the delegation of factual information gathering and analysis, if not actual voting instruction, to specialized firms.
More surprising and puzzling is the role these proxy advisors are now playing in all cases of mergers, acquisitions, proxy contests and all other litigious matters. Within the ISS proxy advisory services is located what they call M&A Edge, which provides independent, in-depth research analysis that focuses specifically on proposed merger and acquisition deals and proxy contests to inform institutional investors. (MSCI, 10K, 2012) For instance, ISS advised institutional investors to vote in favour of the Magna deal with its founder; it urged investors to support the alternate list of CP corporate directors proposed by a Pershing Capital Fund; but it recommended to investors to vote against the takeover of Casey's chain of American convenience stores by Alimentation Couche-Tard! ISS supported Telus management's proposal to convert its non-voting shares into voting shares (without any premium to the voting shareholders). In this case, the CEO of Telus hailed the recommendation from "a trusted neutral expert on corporate governance and proxy voting".
Proxy advisers offer their opinion on almost all litigious, contentious issues. As these issues often come about as a result of the actions of some activist hedge funds, a proxy advisor's favourable opinion, from ISS particularly, is a highly prized input to the argumentation of activist funds.
Proxy advisors actually make recommendations about the price offered for a takeover. Acting as quasiinvestment bankers, they advise their institutional clients (and all shareholders as their "opinion is widely broadcast in the media) whether to hand in their shares, or not, at the proposed price. Here are a few recent examples:
Their involvement in M&A and other litigious transactions _
ALIMENTATION COUCHE TARD (ATD) V. CASEY'S
In ISS's report issued September 15, 2010, ISS concluded that "ATD's currently outstanding offer is far from a compelling starting point for negotiations, and does not merit shareholder support for the ATD slate."
With respect to Couche-Tard and its $38.50 per Casey's share cash tender offer, Glass Lewis states, "In our opinion, the Dissident has not proven that the Offer represents the greatest value for shareholders nor has it shown that the incumbent directors should be removed from the board at this time." 
KINROSS GOLD V. RED BACK
RECOMMENDATION V
Whenever proxy advisors get involved in takeover situations, they are recommending in effect that their institutional clients sell, or not sell, their shares to a would-be acquirer. In those circumstances, they should be subjected to regulations put in place for financial advisers and investment bankers giving an "opinion" to a board about a merger or acquisition transaction. Any such advice given by proxy advisors should inform all parties concerned as to whether the proxy advisor has acted as consultant in any way for any of the parties involved in the transaction over the last two years.
Of course if recommendation 3 above was implemented, that issue would become moot as proxy advisors would be generally prohibited from acting in this capacity.
RECOMMENDATION VI
In cases of proxy contests and other litigious matters, Canadian regulators should adopt the suggestion made by Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz in their submission to the SEC: "Proxy advisory firms should be required to disclose in their recommendations whether the advisor has, currently or within the recent past, been engaged by any participant in the relevant proxy contest, whether any of the interested parties in a contest subscribe to the proxy advisory firm's services, and the aggregate fees paid by the interested parties to the proxy advisory firm".
Their involvement in M&A and other litigious transactions _ This policy paper has stressed the untenable position in which proxy advisory firms find themselves. Neither regulated, nor supervised, proxy advisers rely on a business model that makes it very difficult, virtually impossible for them to handle with care and responsiveness the sheer volume of reports they have to produce in a very short period of time. In the case of ISS, the firm is also vulnerable to conflicts of interests.
Proxy advisors stand in a bully pulpit from which to harangue corporate management and boards of directors on all matters of governance and compensation; neither investors, nor investment advisers, they enjoy a franchise to advise investors on how to discharge their duty or fiduciary responsibility as shareholders.
The dominant actor in this business, ISS, also counsels corporations on how to adjust to, and implement, the advice it is giving to institutional investors. As part of a stock market listed corporation, ISS must find lucrative ways to leverage its dominant market position.
The power and influence exerted by these proxy advisors must be contained and corralled. Their role in defining what is proper governance, what is an effective board and how should executives be compensated is damaging to the performance of corporations. They publish edicts on governance that have little support in empirical research. They have to face up to the implacable logistics of the yearly proxy process in ways that are bound to produce unsatisfactory results.
RESPONSIBILITY OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
Large institutional investors bear a singular responsibility for this state of affairs. They bear the fiduciary responsibility to vote proxies in the interest of their stakeholders, a responsibility they cannot farm out to proxy advisors. Most large institutional investors maintain adamantly that they do not sub-contract this responsibility but merely use proxy advisors as information gatherers and providers of opinions.
Even for that limited role, institutional clients should demand much more transparency about the business model of proxy advisors. Large institutional investors, as clients of proxy advisory services, should demand that they be given full information on their business model: part-time vs. full-time employees, location of employees, extent of work performed in foreign countries, training of employees, proficiency of the staff, the ways the advisory service copes with the logistics of having to formulate opinions/ recommendations on thousands of proposals within a very short time period.
As clients of these advisors, they must, henceforth, demand explicit statements of conflicts of interest whenever these advisors are involved in M&A transactions, proxy contests or other litigious matters. They should insist that proxy advisors disclose at the time of their recommendation whether the advisor has, currently or within the recent past, been engaged by any participant in the relevant M&A transaction or proxy contest, whether any of the interested parties subscribe to the proxy advisory firm's services, and the aggregate fees paid by the interested parties to the proxy advisory firm.
Conclusion _
Finally, institutional investors should state their disagreement with some of the proposed guidelines of proxy advisors. Certainly they should make clear that they do not consider the ISS proposed guidelines on executive compensation appropriate or useful and that they will not give any weight to voting recommendations based on these metrics. There's a key role here for the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance. It has the credibility and the legitimacy to counter the unhealthy influence of proxy advisors on executive compensation.
Canadian institutional investors should object vigorously to ISS basing some of its «guidelines» on poorly designed studies carried out in the American context.
CANADIAN REGULATORS
The regulators should take a strong stance on some of the issues raised here and by many other commentators. The consultation document produced by the Canadian Securities Administrators has provided an excellent summary of the issues as well as some potential remedies. We urge the Canadian regulators to examine the recommendations made in this policy paper as they proceed to set a course forward concerning the proper supervision of proxy advisors.
Indeed, the co-location of two businesses within the same corporation is a recipe for troubles.
Canadian regulators should certainly prohibit ISS from offering its corporate services to corporations about which ISS issues proxy voting recommendations to its institutional clients.
Finally, Canadian regulators should demand that proxy advisors set standards for the training, expertise and experience of analysts preparing proxy advisors' reports.
All in all, the business of proxy advisors, though seemingly filling a need, brings forth a host of issues, which, if they are not dealt with vigorously and effectively, may well result in a warped system of governance and a serious failure of accountability.
Conclusion _ RECOMMENDATION I
Large institutional investors, to the extent that they share the views on compensation defended by IGOPP and others, should make it clear to corporations and to proxy advisors that they do not consider their guidelines on executive compensation appropriate or useful and that they will not give any weight to voting recommendations based on these metrics.
RECOMMENDATION II
Clients of proxy advisors should insist on divulgation of all pertinent details of the business models used by proxy advisors: part-time vs. full-time employees, location of employees, extent of work performed in foreign countries, training of employees.
RECOMMENDATION III
Regulators should require that proxy advisors report on their standards of training and experience for their analysts.
RECOMMENDATION IV
Canadian regulators could and should prohibit ISS from offering its corporate services to corporations about which ISS issues proxy voting recommendations to its institutional clients, in the same way that auditing firms may not offer consulting services to corporations they audit.
RECOMMENDATION V
RECOMMENDATION VI
List of recommendations _
